Introduction
Any consensus on what is required by way of placebased policies is fragile and time limited. In broad historical perspective, what we have is a continuing debate about what we see in the economy, and positions taken in that debate connect with how we see the political and institutional challenges and possibilities. In every period there will be radicals pressing new problem definitions and conservatives defending existing concepts and measures.
The current generation of mainstream academic economists and technocrats are mainly in defensive mode. They are intellectually invested in generic regional recipes like better transport and training, and industrial strategies for building competitive industries of the future, with growth (of national gross domestic product (GDP) or regional gross value added (GVA)) and job creation as success indicators.
Amongst the radical critics is a collective of European academics whose new book, Foundational Economy (Foundational Economy Collective, 2018) argues for recognising the heterogeneity of economic activity and the importance of basic services for citizens in a new civic politics of place. As noted in this article, the position is partly about recovery and restatement of what was taken for granted by an earlier generation of English economists and social theorists like Keynes and Beveridge. This paper which makes these points is organised into three sections.
The first section explains what the foundational economy is and why it matters; the second section considers the problems of implementing foundational politics. The first two sections contain some illustrative Welsh material, while the third and final section considers how Welsh Government has begun to use foundational economy language in policy documents such as the 2017 Economic Action Plan, and whether this has the potential to bring real change in policy directions.
What is the foundational economy and why does it matter?
For the past thirty years or more, economic policy has privileged individual consumption, partly through the preoccupation with (growth of) GDP which is of course more than 60% consumption in the UK case; the bias is reinforced by the focus on jobs and job creation as a way of distributing market income. The inherent limits of GDP as a measure of economic welfare are rehearsed in all the standard histories of the concept (Coyle, 2014; Fioramonti, 2013) . These difficulties are compounded when increases in national GDP (or regional GVA) per capita are socially divisive, because they are unequally distributed between working households, As Figure 1 shows, over the past 50 years the top 20% of working households claim nearly half the nominal income growth, while the bottom 20% claim a negligible share. This paper suggests a change of lens, and argues for a new focus on the social wellbeing of citizens, which in the developmental frame of Sen (1999) Figure 2 shows, in Wales providential services account for 33% of employment and material infrastructure for another 15%, and these shares will vary across Wales. Most of this employment is sheltered with wages and conditions not determined by international competition; although supply chains, as with food and energy, often extend nationally and internationally.
The foundational provision of essentials is crucial to wellbeing on the demand side; and, large enough by any metric on the supply side. However, it is only part of a larger whole and one of the crucial intellectual questions is how we think of that larger economy. In mainstream economics, the larger whole is a singular 'economy' whose elements can be added together as in calculations of GDP and are classically underpinned by one supposed law of value. In foundational thinking, the larger whole is reconceptualised as a complex totality which, in Figure 3 services provided by decently paid workers. On this basis, the standard political offer is 'vote for us and we will make the economy work for you'. And the immediate problem is that national economic policy rests on a misunderstanding about growth drivers; and regional economic policy does not by its own criteria deliver relative improvement. Since the 1980s, the UK economy is not productively driven but consumption and debt led by a system of 'privatized Keynesianism' (Crouch, 2009); unsustainable growth of GDP is bought through housing equity withdrawal which allows rising house prices to leak into consumption. In historical perspective, the foundational economy (public or privately owned) had historically been low risk, steady return with long time horizons and expectations of a 5% return on capital. Privatization in the 1980s, and outsourcing in the 1990s then brought in stock market quoted corporates, private equity houses and fund investors with market-driven requirements for a return of more than 10%, and financialised business models developed in high risk, high return, short time horizon activities.
Foundational politics and how to do it
As we have explained elsewhere (Bowman et al., 2015) (Bowman et al., 2014, pp.134-9) Delivery Plan promises 'the number of jobs in the foundational economy will be increased' without justifying the objective or explaining how this is to be achieved.
The Welsh Government has borrowed the new foundational language but it is not clear whether it can move from talking foundational economy in an often confused way to doing foundational economy in a new and radical way. And the fundamental issues at stake here are not about economic policy objectives and policy levers. The question is whether Welsh Government can take an active role in sponsoring a new municipal politics which is prerequisite if the foundational project is to gain form and substance.
